

Content hand-over Design issues

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¹³ Design issues for content hand-over

¹⁴ Creating new URI schemes (or not)

¹⁵ The W3C suggests avoiding creation of new URI schemes¹ but instead dispatch-¹⁶ ing instead on the type of the representation (i.e. the content-type). Creating ¹⁷ new content-types is substantially easier than it used to be² and is compatible ¹⁸ with sending those content-types via http or email.

data:application/vnd.myapp.myobject,here-is-my-object is one way to pass
small bits of content-typed data around as URIs, but we should be careful not
to overuse inline data.

 $_{22}$ Ascribing semantics to a subtree of http, like Apple does for [https://developer.

23 apple.com/library/ios/featuredarticles/iPhoneURLScheme_Reference/

²⁴ MapLinks/MapLinks.html#//apple_ref/doc/uid/TP40007899-CH5-SW1"

²⁵ map links] in recent iOS, is another way to avoid new URI schemes.

²⁶ D-Bus or not?

D-Bus has some subtleties for how it interacts with AppArmor: the caller of a 27 method, or the sender of a signal, needs permission to send to the recipient (in 28 its profile), and the recipient needs permission to receive from the sender (in 29 *its* profile). We are trying to avoid relying on fine-grained message filtering 30 (e.g. by interface) because that won't work on kdbus. This means we might 31 have to work out something clever here if we want pairs of arbitrary apps from 32 different app-bundles to be able to interact directly: we'd need either some way 33 to have "equivalence classes" of apps, or a trusted D-Bus proxy that rate-limits 34 and filters messages. 35

¹http://www.w3.org/TR/webarch/#URI-scheme ²https://www.iana.org/form/media-types

Another possibility would be for Didcot (or Canterbury) to proxy authorized requests between app-bundles; we could have the requester call a method on Didcot that results in Didcot calling o.fd.Application.Open or o.fd.Application.Activate³ on the provider, if it considers the provider to be suitable.

This is fine for "launch" and "open URI", but not really up to the job for a more complex interface (search-provider-style) or for an interface with more data (search results coming back). We could potentially have an API through which we fd-pass a socket, or pass through an abstract socket by name, or something, and then do D-Bus over that; but then we lose total ordering of messages, and become sad.

In the non-D-Bus corner, we could use a mesh of 1-1 connections between apps;
but then we have a mesh of 1-1 connections between apps, we've still lost total
ordering, and we potentially need to reinvent message framing.

⁵⁰ smcv's instinct here is to use D-Bus for everything that is a one-off action in ⁵¹ response to something the user does; seriously consider using D-Bus for query-⁵² style APIs; and probably avoid D-Bus for TPEG, since that presumably already

⁵³ has framing, and we might end up doing the filtering navigation-app-side.

⁵⁴ Can we use GDesktopAppInfo rather than reinventing it?

⁵⁵ GAppInfo provides nice APIs for the basics of what Didcot does.

⁵⁶ Unfortunately, it assumes that applications can be launched with direct D-Bus ⁵⁷ activation (not true if we are relying on Didcot for launching, unless we have ⁵⁸ additional infrastructure that helps us out) and that they have .desktop files.

59 Options:

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- patch GDesktopAppInfo for Apertis
- write our own high-level API which will end up rather similar (potentially
- even identical), perhaps in its own LGPL-licensed library so it can copy bits from GDesktopAppInfo, and optionally patch GLib documentation
- to say not to use GDesktopAppInfo
- require that every app/agent is DBusActivatable, generate .desktop files from their manifests, and use a D-Bus proxy to transform activation requests into what we need

• generate .service files so that every app/agent *is* DBusActivatable, use

a D-Bus proxy or clever AppArmor rules to make that work, and bypassDidcot entirely

⁷¹ Should Didcot and Canterbury be the same thing?

Canterbury is a trusted intermediary for launching apps. So is Didcot, if youthink about it. Maybe they should merge?

 $^{^{3}} http://standards.freedesktop.org/desktop-entry-spec/1.1/ar01s08.html$

⁷⁴ Maintaining established communications

⁷⁵ Do we have a use-case for this, that is not already satisfied by "list providers

⁷⁶ and start querying them again"?

77 Registration mechanism

⁷⁸ It looks like we're going to need:

- I handle foo: (scheme)
 - I handle everything in foo://bar (scheme + authority)
- I handle everything starting with foo://bar/baz/ (scheme + authority - path-prefix) (?)
- I open files of type foo/bar
- I open files of type foo/* (?)
- I open all files (?)

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• I can share files of type foo/bar, foo/* (?), all files

⁸⁷ and for the streaming-ish use cases:

• I implement org.apertis.PointOfInterestProvider (etc.)

This is, not coincidentally, a lot like .desktop files. We could make the encoding in the manifest somewhat similar, and auto-generate a .desktop file if desired. Something like this (using YAML here because it's easier to hand-write, apply the obvious mapping into JSON for production):

entry_points: 93 com.example.MyApp: content_types: foo/bar - foo/* url_handler: - "foo:" 94 "foo://bar" - "foo://bar/baz/" com.example.MyAgent: 95 implements: - org.apertis.PointOfInterestProvider 96

⁹⁷ Security considerations

⁹⁸ URI scheme/media-type hijacking

⁹⁹ It is important to note that URI schemes and media types will, in general,
¹⁰⁰ be a "first come, first served" shared resource. The Scheme Hijacking attack
¹⁰¹ described in Unauthorized Cross-App Resource Access on MAC OS X and iOS⁴
¹⁰² §3.4 relies on the attacker registering for a URI scheme that an app developer
¹⁰³ had (mis)used as a general IPC mechanism.

One thing we can do to improve on iOS' behaviour here is to provide IPC mechanisms that automatically convey app and user identity information that cannot be faked, such as D-Bus, and document them as a better way to solve the problems that iOS app developers are trying to solve by making up URI schemes.

⁴https://drive.google.com/file/d/0BxxXk1d3yyuZOFlsdkNMSGswSGs/view?pli=1

For example, there should be a way for a pair of cooperating applications to
declare in their app-bundle manifests that each may communicate with the other
via D-Bus. Executables in the same app-bundle should just be able to do D-Bus
to each other anyway, no questions asked.

¹¹³ Documentation for the content handover feature should recommend these other
¹¹⁴ IPC mechanisms, and caution against using content handover to transfer cre¹¹⁵ dentials.

¹¹⁶ Bidirectional content handover

One feature that was considered is bidirectional content handover. We recommend treating this as out-of-scope: it requires thought to be put into security between apps, and in particular what we want to allow apps to do. If general bidirectional channels between pairs of apps are required, they should use a protocol such as D-Bus or an AF_UNIX socket, which provides secure authentication (credentials that cannot be faked, including the uid and AppArmor profile). ()

124 Terminating the launched app

¹²⁵ Suppose app A launches app B via content handover. One design question that
¹²⁶ was considered was whether app A should be able to terminate app B.

¹²⁷ We recommend that this capability is not offered: if it was misused, it would be

easy for a user to misinterpret it as app B crashing. ()